Two Lessons We Aren't Learning: Part One

I went to a meeting of the Milwaukee County Democratic Party the other night. I learned a couple of things that indicate, at least to me, why Democrats aren't winning the way they should, or at least might.

Martha Laning, the outgoing state Democratic chair (whom we will miss), brought a powerpoint of stats from the 2018 elections that saw the end (at least temporarily) of the venomous Scott Walker as governor, as well as a new attorney general and state treasurer. But that's the tip of the iceberg.

Republicans still command an overwhelming advantage in the state assembly, thanks to their clever, lock-down gerrymandering which saw them garner a whole 46% of the vote, but 63% of control. Wisconsin's new Darth Vader seems to be Robin Vos, the speaker of the assembly, who has vowed not just to oppose new governor Tony Evers' budget, but eviscerate it by simply striking his proposals before they even get to the assembly floor.

To do statistical analysis is to deal in history. What was the situation and how did it change? This past decade demonstrated what happens when a party isn't nearly as united as it appears to be, and how that devastates it in terms of tracking both loyal supporters and those undecideds--the ones who, in the end, really do decide elections.

To wit: Laning made it clear that the state Democrats did not gain from Barack Obama's elections as president, though he carried Wisconsin both times. The issue was infrastructure: Obama ran a totally independent national organizing scheme called Organizing for America. It was energetic, it got out in front of everyone else (thus turning back Hillary Clinton a first time), and its messaging resonated. Those were important reasons why Obama won.

But in the wake of his elections, OFA did not share its organizing information with the national Democratic Party, nor with the state parties. They were left on their own. In 2010, when Walker ran the first time, Democrats did not have the advantage of the up-to-date, superior information base that OFA had accumulated. They were doing things like calling dead people three or four times without knowing they had been deceased, or "doing doors," as it's called, to find that supporters had moved or died. This always happens a little bit, but without recent information, each day that old information is used, it becomes more and more inadequate. This wastes time and resources, especially volunteer efforts. They become discouraged and don't come back for more work.

Walker won. Taking control of the legislature as well, Republicans devastated several public unions, draining heretofore solid organizing support for Democrats, and unleashed an apportionment plan that, so far, has survived U.S. Supreme Court scrutiny (they basically punted) and froze representation into very unrepresentative but very favorable positions (see above stat).

The Democrats managed to forge support for a recall election in 2011 (which was more emotional than substantive, leading to its demise), but dealing with the same organizing issues, the Democrats lost by nearly the same percentage than they had in 2010, and lost again similarly in 2014.

I worked the northwest part of the state for the National Education Association in the latter part of the 2012 Wisconsin campaign, though I then lived in Arkansas. The area was still filled with defiant, but oddly inertial, union folks. Many blamed Obama for not coming back to Wisconsin to campaign for Milwaukee Mayor Tom Barrett, who went after Walker in the recall; same candidate, same result. They were going to vote for Obama--Mitt Romney sure wasn't an acceptable alternative--but didn't want to be seen to be as actively in support of the campaign.

They believed Obama had betrayed them at that pivotal moment. That's a matter of perspective. The true damage was beneath the surface, and the Wisconsin Democratic Party wouldn't recover from it until 2018--after two terms of Walker's deep undermining of the meaning of good government. Other state legislatures flipped to Republicans as well, and Democrats quickly lost both houses of Congress in 2010. The Democrats had the White House--and that's about it.

I also worked the same part of the state for AFSCME in support of Hillary Clinton's 2016 campaign. It appeared to be short on organizing expertise, thoroughness and spending. It spent half the money that Obama had spent in 2008. It seemed to accept that it would carry Wisconsin. There were fewer rallies, she of course did not return to the state for the final campaign, and I saw next to no yard signs. Like Obama's 2012 campaign, there was clearly some support, but little enthusiasm.

But that support had crumbled. Traveling from small town to small town in my regular job as union rep, I decided to stop into some coffee shops to read some of the weekly newspapers to get a feel for the surrounding public's attitudes about a presidential campaign that looked to me (and to most until the last minute) like a slam dunk. I had returned to Wisconsin full-time after seven years absence, so I was just getting used to the completely different atmosphere surrounding unions. It seemed like Mars.

So I was stunned when I saw op-ed pages filled with hysterical, apocalyptic comments about Clinton, detached from reality by light-years. The 45 propaganda machine had taken hold in rural Wisconsin, not the least of which was due to previous Republican resurgence in that region. In 2012, counties surrounding Eau Claire had turned slightly red in carrying for Romney, but not so much so that it would have turned the re-election campaign against Obama. Now it appeared to be deep, beet red.

Doing doors in Chippewa Falls and Eau Claire--two formerly Democratic bastions--in the final weeks, I found plenty of switching: those who were once counted on to vote Democratic, which was why I was at their doors in the first place, but who told me that it was suddenly none of my business who they voted for. That disingenuousness said one thing: We can't stand Hillary so we're voting for 45. All I was there for was counting, so I couldn't engage them. Chippewa Falls, in particular, had gone red. Eau Claire stayed blue but a much lighter tone.

I returned to the headquarters to report my findings. "We're going to get destroyed in Chippewa Falls," I kept saying. "I'm telling you, we're in trouble."

But I found a degree of disbelief evident. After all, not nearly enough folks had kept track of what was really going on; there were neither the resources nor the attention. The bridge of what seemed to be endless Democratic support had crumbled while no one had checked the underpinnings, and it was on the edge of complete collapse. By ten p.m. on election night, the upset was becoming obvious, the room of supporters had thinned in Eau Claire, and the finger-pointing had already begun.

The lessons have been learned. First of all, when elections end, organizers are released because their vital but temporary tasks have ended for now. A state party needs constant help re-organizing its information to meet new realities, though, so moneys have been raised to keep staffs larger than they once were. That was a development I was glad to hear.

But that money can run out. More donors are needed. Except the state's Democrats are up against a money machine that can only be described as insidious and tsunami-like. That brings us to the second lesson of Things We Still Haven't Learned. That one I'll tell you when I come back.

Be well. I'll see you down the road.


Mister Mark